While most of our attention has remained fixed on al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State—Khorasan Province (ISKP), there is an increasingly dangerous layer of transnational terrorist groups thriving under Taliban rule in Afghanistan. These groups are no longer marginal or fragmented. Thanks to Taliban and al-Qaeda protections, regional alliances, and a steady influx of foreign fighters, they have established permanent operational bases, recruitment pipelines, and command structures. These “second-tier” terrorist organizations, now numbering in the tens of thousands, are rapidly transforming Afghanistan into a launchpad for regional insurgency and global jihad.
The most prominent among these is Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has become the second-largest designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in Afghanistan behind al-Qaeda. With over 15,000 fighters and their family members now settled across southern and eastern provinces, TTP has entrenched itself deeply into the Afghan landscape. The group operates dozens of training camps near the Pakistani border, using these safe zones to conduct cross-border attacks against Pakistan. TTP’s leadership is firmly integrated into the broader jihadist ecosystem: Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud leads the group, while its Defense Minister, Mufti Muzahim, also holds a senior seat on al-Qaeda’s Shura Council inside Afghanistan. TTP’s central command hub is based in Kandahar Province (see image below), while its Civil Commission operates from Paktika—further underscoring the group’s formalized structure and operational depth.
Quickly expanding in Afghanistan like the TTP is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), often referred to in Afghanistan as the Syrian Mujahideen. Once a Syria-based faction, HTS now fields more than 12,000 fighters across northern and northeastern Afghanistan. This sharp increase is directly linked to a decree issued on April 8, 2025, by Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, who ordered that 20% of the Taliban’s military personnel be transferred to “partner groups.” Most of these redeployed fighters went to TTP and HTS, marking further formalization of the Taliban’s military cooperation with FTOs. HTS’s Afghan-based brigades include the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade and the Saad bin Abi Waqqas Brigade, both named after revered Islamic warriors—signaling the ideological intent to frame their operations as a continuation of history.
Another critical actor is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which currently operates primarily from northern Afghanistan. IMU commands a force of roughly 5,000 fighters, a figure that swelled significantly in 2025 due to an influx of Uzbek, Chechen, and Kazakh militants previously based in Syria. Led by Mawlawi Ibrahim in Afghanistan, the IMU benefits from proximity to Central Asia and shares operational space with other regional groups, forming a forward base for potential jihadist operations targeting former Soviet republics and Chinese interests.
Also operating in the same vicinity is the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which has established a footprint of approximately 3,500 fighters in Afghanistan. TIP’s presence also grew sharply in 2025 following the mass movement of fighters from Syria to Afghanistan. Now led on the ground by Abu Ibrahim al-Turkistani, TIP's fighters are largely focused on advancing Uyghur nationalist jihadist aims but are increasingly integrated into the broader Islamist military movement taking shape under Taliban protection.
Perhaps the most striking resurgence is that of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which had been reduced to roughly 500 fighters inside Afghanistan by the end of 2023. Today, the group has rebounded to nearly 4,000 Uyghur and Turkmen militants, with additional forces in the thousands deployed in Syria and reportedly seeking to join the Syrian military under its current terrorist leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani (who now goes by Ahmed Sharaa). ETIM is commanded by Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, a long-standing jihadist figure who has received protection and support from the Taliban’s intelligence wing—particularly from Tajmir Jawad, the deputy head of the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). This high-level protection signals ETIM’s value within the Taliban’s broader strategy to maintain alliances with the group as a counterweight to excessive Chinese influence.
This explosive growth across multiple jihadist factions did not happen in a vacuum. The mass movement of fighters into Afghanistan began in earnest in 2022 after the U.S. government took its eye off Afghanistan following its August 2021 retreat, but 2025 has seen a surge due to a steady flow of returnees from Syria and new recruits drawn by the ideological and operational alignment between Islamist governments in Kabul and Damascus. These movements are not merely ideological fellow travelers—they are increasingly acting as a coordinated, interlinked military front spanning Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. The massive numbers of foreign fighters now operating inside Afghanistan should raise immediate alarm across Western intelligence and policy circles, especially as the goal is to turn Syria into a terrorist base as well.
Yet this second wave of jihadist expansion is being downplayed—or outright ignored—by Western governments and analysts, many of whom remain fixated solely on the Islamic State and primarily ISKP. In reality, groups like TTP, HTS, IMU, TIP, and ETIM are now as entrenched and as threatening, with clear pathways to project violence beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The Taliban has not only welcomed them but has begun institutionalizing their presence, giving them Afghan identity documents and integrating them into the country’s jihadist infrastructure by providing them housing and sustenance. What is forming now is not just a haven for terrorism, but the foundation of a transnational Islamic army—one whose ambitions extend far beyond Afghanistan’s borders.