Today we are talking about Adam Hamawy HAM ah Wee, the Democratic nominee in New Jersey’s 12th Congressional District, and this is not going to be a fluffy political episode.
This district includes Cranbury, New Jersey. That matters because Cranbury was home to Todd Beamer, one of the passengers on United Flight 93 on September 11th. Todd Beamer was murdered by al-Qaeda terrorists. He is remembered for “let’s roll,” because he and other passengers fought back when it mattered most. These heroes stopped a plane from going into the U.S. Capitol.
Now, in that same district, voters may send a man to Congress who volunteered in Bosnia in the 1990s with Benevolence International Foundation aka BIF, an organization later designated by the U.S. Treasury as a financier of terrorism and listed by the United Nations as associated with al-Qaeda.
That is the issue.
And I want to be very clear from the start. Hamawy has not been charged with terrorism. He served in the U.S. military. He was a combat surgeon. He is credited with saving lives, including Senator Tammy Duckworth’s life in Iraq.
But public service later in life does not erase the national security question.
Because we are not talking about a bad tweet. We are not talking about youthful politics. We are talking about a man who, in the 1990s, had a documented relationship with the Blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel-Rahman, and then volunteered with BIF in Bosnia, at the exact moment Bosnia was one of the central jihadist pipelines into Europe.
That is not normal.
The Blind Sheikh was not a misunderstood cleric. Omar Abdel-Rahman was convicted in 1995 for seditious conspiracy tied to plots against New York landmarks. His followers were linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This was one of the most important terrorism prosecutions in U.S. history before 9/11. And he was even one of the terrorists al-Qaeda hoped to released when they attempted to kidnap Ambassador Stevens
Hamawy reportedly traveled with the Blink Sheikh, translated for him, and testified on his behalf during the trial.
That alone deserves scrutiny.
Then comes Bosnia.
In 1994, Hamawy volunteered with BIF. At the time, Bosnia was a magnet for foreign fighters, facilitators, charities, weapons networks, money flows, and jihadist infrastructure. This was the era when al-Qaeda was still building out its global support architecture. The brand name was not always the point. The network was the point.
That is how these groups operate. They do not always show up with a sign that says “al-Qaeda office.” They use charities. They use humanitarian fronts. They use medical aid. They use relief convoys. They use legitimate suffering as cover for recruitment, logistics, finance, and access.
And years later, The United Nations listed BIF as associated with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.
So when people say, “Well, maybe he was only delivering medical supplies,” my answer is: that is exactly why these networks use medical and charity covers. So they can fool you.
This is not fantasyland. This is tradecraft.
You do not get to separate the humanitarian wrapper from the operational network when the organization itself is later identified as part of al-Qaeda’s support structure.
And this is also where we need to talk about the U.S. military.
Because if someone has volunteered with an organization the runs cover for al-Qaeda, and had a documented relationship with the Blind Sheikh, how was that person permitted to join the U.S. military?
That is a vetting problem.
I do not care what party you are in. I do not care what your politics are. If you joined, supported, volunteered for, worked with, or embedded yourself inside a terrorist-linked network, that should follow you forever in national security vetting.
Not because people cannot change. Because access matters.
The U.S. military missed something here. Or it accepted something it should not have accepted. Either way, that is the lesson. We have spent years lowering the bar, explaining things away, pretending ideological histories do not matter, and hoping people age out of radical networks.
That is not how this works.
Terrorist movements are not college clubs. They are not activist phases. They are not mistakes you brush off because someone later got credentials.
Less than one percent of committed terrorists truly leave the cause. Even some of the famous “former” figures are still playing games. Abu Hafs al-Mauritani is a perfect example of why you do not casually accept the former-terrorist narrative. These people know how to rebrand, reposition, and deceive. They understand patience. They understand access. They understand how Western systems forgive what they should remember.
You do not play with terrorists.
You get burned.
Now let’s move to Congress.
If Hamawy wins in November, Congress has options. They may not use them, because Congress is usually weak when courage is required, but the options exist.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution says each House is the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Historically, Congress has used that power to examine whether members-elect should be seated. It is rare, but it has happened.
One example is Brigham Roberts of Utah in 1899. He was elected to the House, but the House refused to seat him because of controversy over polygamy.
Another example is Victor Berger of Wisconsin. Berger was elected after being convicted under the Espionage Act during World War I. The House refused to seat him, and when voters sent him back again, the House refused again.
Then there is Adam Clayton Powell Jr. In 1967, the House excluded him over misconduct allegations, but the Supreme Court later ruled in Powell v. McCormack that the House could not exclude a duly elected member who met the Constitution’s basic qualifications.
That case matters.
Because it means Congress cannot just say, “We do not like this person,” and refuse to seat him. The constitutional qualifications for the House are age, citizenship, and state residency. So if Congress tries to refuse seating based only on past conduct, that becomes legally difficult.
But that does not mean Congress is powerless.
It can investigate. It can delay and refer questions to committee. It can examine whether there are constitutional disqualification issues. It can demand records. It can hold hearings. It can force the truth into daylight.
And after a member is seated, the House can expel a member with a two-thirds vote.
That is the clean constitutional route: investigate, expose, and if warranted, expel.
Will they do it? Probably not.
Because Congress is filled with people who are very brave on cable news and very weak when the institution actually has to defend itself.
But the red line should be simple.
Members of al-Qaeda’s support networks should not sit in the United States Congress.
People who built relationships with the Blind Sheikh should not be waved through because years have passed.
People who volunteered along al-Qaeda-associates should not be placed inside classified briefings, defense conversations, foreign affairs discussions, or homeland security decision-making.
This is not about religion. It is not about ethnicity. It is not about political disagreement.
It is about terrorist access.
And after 9/11, we should have learned this already.
Todd Beamer did not have the luxury of pretending al-Qaeda was theoretical. He saw what that network did inside an airplane. He fought back with no staff, no committee, no hearing, and no escape route—and literally saved the lives of members of congress and their staff,
Congress has more tools than Todd Beamer had.
The question is whether it has even one percent of his courage.
Time will tell.
Thanks for being here today on the Watch Floor.