One of the clearest lessons from October 7th is that preparedness cannot be built around the assumption that the systems we depend on will still be working once an attack begins. Israel had cameras, sensors, communications, military forces, intelligence, and years of experience watching Hamas. Hamas studied those systems too. When the attack began, observation posts were hit, communications were disrupted, multiple locations were attacked at once, and local communities were forced to operate before the national response could fully understand the scale of what was happening. The lesson for the United States is not to stop using technology. It is to stop assuming it will always be there when we need it.
Exercises should test what happens when those systems begin failing together. Start with a manageable incident, then remove the tools responders normally rely on. Shut down camera feeds. Degrade cellular service. Overload radio traffic. Take away GPS. Close a major road. Delay mutual aid. Introduce a second incident while resources are already committed to the first. Force police, emergency management, hospitals, schools, and local government to continue operating while the information picture becomes less clear, not more. The goal should be to see whether people can still make decisions when they do not have the full picture and cannot immediately reach the person they normally call.
That matters because real attacks do not unfold neatly. Dispatch may be overwhelmed. Hospitals may begin receiving casualties before they understand what happened. Roads may be blocked. Social media may fill with false reports, old videos, incorrect casualty numbers, and claims of additional attacks. Senior leaders may be unreachable at the exact moment decisions need to be made. A good exercise should expose those weaknesses before an adversary does. It should force organizations to answer basic questions about who has authority, how people communicate when normal systems fail, how information is verified, and how long local responders can function before outside help arrives.
The difference between Nahal Oz and Nir Am on October 7th shows why that matters. At Nahal Oz, much of the local security team’s weapons access was affected when the power failed, while at Nir Am, local defenders, police, and military personnel were able to organize quickly enough to prevent attackers from penetrating the community. The point is not to duplicate Israel’s local security model here. The point is that there will always be a gap between the first sign of an attack and the arrival of enough help. That gap has to be part of the exercise. If every scenario assumes reinforcements arrive immediately, communications stay up, and medical support remains available, then the exercise is testing the plan under the conditions most favorable to it.
Intelligence warning should be tested the same way. October 7th showed that warning rarely arrives as one clear piece of information. It comes in fragments. A communication pattern changes. A source reports something unusual. An adversary moves personnel or equipment. Activity that once looked routine begins to shift. Individually, any one indicator may mean very little. The problem comes when several indicators start changing at the same time and the organization continues to treat each one as isolated because the prevailing assessment says an attack is unlikely. Exercises should include incomplete and sometimes conflicting reporting so leaders have to decide when the accumulation is enough to justify a different posture.
That is an important habit to build because waiting for certainty can become its own failure. The question should not be whether participants correctly predict the attack. The question should be whether they recognize when the risk has changed enough to do something different. Maybe that means moving additional personnel, alerting local security, positioning medical resources, or simply telling people to stay ready. Those decisions can buy time, and time matters when the original assessment turns out to be wrong.
The purpose of an exercise should not be to prove that a plan works. It should be to find where it breaks. Turn systems off. Delay the response. Remove information. Create conflicting reports. Force people to make decisions before certainty exists. If the exercise only works when every camera, radio, network, map, and command system is functioning normally, then it has not tested the organization for the conditions it is most likely to face during a serious attack.
October 7th showed what can happen when an adversary studies the systems a country depends on and then attacks those dependencies. We should assume others were watching and learning from it as well. The lesson is simple: do not just train for the attack. Train for the failure of the systems you expect to help you respond to it. That is where the real vulnerabilities are usually hiding.