The Commons · Practice the Response
Capitol Complex: Multiple Incidents During a High-Demand Day is a discussion-based community exercise. It is intentionally written around responder decisions and public-safety consequences, not attacker tradecraft.
How to use this exercise.
Invite the people who would actually have to coordinate: local government, law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management, hospitals, public health, schools or houses of worship, venue or business leadership, communications staff, utilities, and community organizations. One facilitator reads each round. Participants explain what they would do with the information available at that moment.
Exercise rule: Do not spend the session designing a better attack. Keep the discussion on command, communication, life safety, resource allocation, credential verification, public information, medical surge, continuity, and recovery.
Setting.
The exercise takes place in Washington, D.C., during a busy congressional day with a large permitted public gathering in the area. Traffic control, protective details, transit activity, and mutual-aid resources are already under pressure before the exercise begins.
Starting pressure.
Participants begin with normal operations, elevated call volume, and several agencies working overlapping missions. The exercise assumes no advance intelligence identifying a specific attack time or exact method.
First reports
Dispatch receives reports of two near-simultaneous explosions affecting public areas of the Capitol complex. Initial assessment raises the possibility of concealed person-borne explosive devices, but that is not yet confirmed. Early information is contradictory. Some callers report additional suspicious persons while others report only blast effects and panic.
A second kind of threat
Within minutes, gunfire is reported at a separate location in the broader Capitol area. It is not clear whether the incidents are connected. Crowds begin moving in several directions and transit access is disrupted.
Credential problem
A report comes in about an individual wearing police-style clothing who is giving directions that conflict with official instructions. Their identity cannot immediately be verified. Participants must decide how credentials and instructions are authenticated without freezing the response.
Secondary pressure
A second wave of violence is reported away from the original scene while bomb technicians are still evaluating the first area. Several agencies request the same specialized resources at once.
Information war
A false social-media post claims another government building has been attacked and urges people to evacuate toward an area responders are trying to keep clear. National media request confirmation while family members flood emergency lines.
Sustainment
Hospitals report a rapid casualty surge. Senior officials need continuity-of-government decisions, responder accountability is incomplete, and the public wants to know whether the threat is over.
Discussion questions.
- Who establishes unified command, and how quickly can federal and local command structures share a common operating picture?
- How are conflicting evacuation, shelter, and perimeter instructions reconciled and communicated?
- How are responder credentials verified when uniforms, vehicles, and agency markings cannot be accepted at face value?
- What resources are kept in reserve for a second wave instead of committing everything to the first scene?
- How are casualty collection, EMS access, hospital distribution, and family reunification coordinated across multiple scenes?
- Who owns public messaging, rumor control, and correction of false online information?
- What continuity functions must remain operational even while the immediate life-safety response is underway?
Close the exercise.
End with three lists: what worked, what failed or was unclear, and who owns each corrective action. Set a date to revisit the highest-priority fixes. FEMA HSEEP guidance can be used to formalize objectives, evaluation, and an After-Action Report/Improvement Plan.