The Commons · Practice the Response
Johnstown: Veterans Event and a Second Downtown Incident is a discussion-based community exercise. It is intentionally written around responder decisions and public-safety consequences, not attacker tradecraft.
How to use this exercise.
Invite the people who would actually have to coordinate: local government, law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management, hospitals, public health, schools or houses of worship, venue or business leadership, communications staff, utilities, and community organizations. One facilitator reads each round. Participants explain what they would do with the information available at that moment.
Exercise rule: Do not spend the session designing a better attack. Keep the discussion on command, communication, life safety, resource allocation, credential verification, public information, medical surge, continuity, and recovery.
Setting.
The exercise takes place in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, during a well-attended veterans recognition event at a civic gathering space. A second large community activity is underway elsewhere in the city, and normal staffing has already been stretched by traffic, event security, and routine calls.
Starting pressure.
The scenario is designed for a smaller jurisdiction that cannot assume unlimited specialized resources will arrive immediately. Mutual aid, hospitals, volunteer organizations, churches, veterans groups, and county partners should all be considered part of the response picture.
Attack on the veterans event
Emergency calls report an explosion and active violence at the veterans recognition event. Initial callers describe multiple casualties, confusion about exits, and people attempting to self-evacuate by vehicle and on foot.
Separate incident
A second violent incident is reported in another downtown public gathering area. Dispatch must decide whether to split limited resources while the first scene is still unstable.
Suspicious vehicle
A vehicle associated with the response area is reported as a possible vehicle-borne explosive threat. The report is unconfirmed, but it affects an access route responders and ambulances expected to use.
Impersonation concern
A caller reports someone in responder-style clothing trying to direct civilians and access a restricted area. The information may be mistaken, but it creates a credential-verification problem during an already fragmented response.
Medical and community surge
The nearest hospital reports it is receiving self-transported patients faster than expected. Churches, veterans organizations, and community groups offer buildings, volunteers, transportation, and family-support assistance.
Recovery begins before the threat is fully resolved
Schools and families ask whether they should shelter or reunify, rumors spread online about additional attacks, and the community needs a credible public update while investigators are still determining what happened.
Discussion questions.
- What is the minimum command structure needed when the jurisdiction is simultaneously managing two scenes?
- Which mutual-aid requests happen automatically, and which require an approval that could slow the response?
- How are veterans organizations and community volunteers used safely without creating additional accountability problems?
- How does EMS distribute casualties if the nearest hospital is saturated or difficult to reach?
- What backup communications exist if normal radio or cellular systems become overloaded?
- Where do families receive verified information and reunification support?
- Which corrective actions can a small jurisdiction realistically complete within 30, 60, and 90 days?
Close the exercise.
End with three lists: what worked, what failed or was unclear, and who owns each corrective action. Set a date to revisit the highest-priority fixes. FEMA HSEEP guidance can be used to formalize objectives, evaluation, and an After-Action Report/Improvement Plan.